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Abstract: The article is about the possibility of an international military presence as an 
enforcement peacekeeping mission in the Ukrainian conflict in Donbas region. It starts with 
a short story-line of the conflict, identifying all the actors involved and what role they play in 
it.  Analyzing the arguments behind the demand for an international peacekeeping mission 
and examining the circumstances in which the conflict happens the essay investigation is 
around the question “Can the external military presence in Donbas constitute an 
international peacekeeping mission?”. In order to conduct this research, we recurred to the 
doctrine as well as to articles and official documents and declarations to better understand 
the theme. 
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1. Introduction
Past more than two decades since the end of the Cold War and at that time it seemed 
that war and conflict in Europe was left in the past, and the talking about a peaceful and 
prosperous East Europe began. But everything changed when in March 2014 using an 
unrecognized referendum in Crimea- Ukraine, Russia annexed this region into the Russian 
Federation. A few days later pro-Russian protesters occupied the government buildings in 
cities of Donetsk, Luhansk in East of Ukraine, seeking a referendum too. As a response, 
Ukrainian government ordered an anti-terrorist operation (ATO) against the rebels so it 
could regain the control. However, in May that year separatists set up an unrecognized 
referendum and declared themselves independent from Ukrainian authorities forming two 
separatist republics of Lugansk (LPR) and Donetsk (DPR). The armed fighting between the 
rebels and Ukrainian forces went on when in the summer of 2014 the insurgents shut down 
an international flight plane MH17 causing the death of 298 people.  
Meanwhile, Russia has been backing up the separatists suppling them with weapons 
and men and Russian parliament authorized the use of Russian military force in Ukraine. At 
the same time the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) announced sanctions 
against Russia, accusing it to be part of the conflict2, (BBC News, 2016). Finally, suffering a 
big defeat from pro-Russian separatists, Ukraine signs the first ceasefire agreement in Minsk 
(Europarl.europa.eu, 2016). Despite that, the agreement was later violated by pro-Russia 
separatists, who in time seized another strategically important territory in Eastern Ukraine, 
including the Donetsk airport, leading to another escalation of violence (ibdem:6).  
1 Master degree student in International Relations, with emphasis in Peace and Security Studies at the 
Faculty of Economy of the University of Coimbra. Master in Criminal Science at University of Petre 
Andrei in Iasi, Romania. Bachelor in Law at the European University in Republic of Moldova.  
2 Ukraine released a video with captured Russian paratroopers. 
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   In February 2015 there was another peace agreement: Minsk 2 singed by both sides 
of the conflict, however the violence has never stopped, as many OSCE reports announce 
(Norman, L.,2015:3). Shortly after the Ukrainian government made a peacekeeping request 
to the United Nations (UN) Security Council and to the UN Secretary General for opening the 
discussion to invite peacekeepers in Ukraine (Interfax: Ukraine Business Daily, 2015) to get 
control of the Ukrainian-Russian border in order to stop the troops and the ammunition 
supply coming into Ukraine and to guarantee peace and stability in the buffer zone of the 
conflict in Donbas. Currently, according to reports of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) the armed fighting in this zone sporadically continues 
(Osce.org, 2016). 
    Although Ukrainian crises appeared as a shock for international community and it was 
largely covered by Mass-media a few authors in academic area focus their analyses on this 
conflict especially when taken in consideration the dilemma of a military peacekeeping 
mission in Donbas. As many leaders stated the Ukrainian crisis is a game changer and the 
peace and stability in this region is vital for regional peace and global security, we consider 
important that the question guiding this research would be: Can the external military 
presence in Donbas constitute an international peacekeeping mission? 
Analyzing the facts of this conflict is essential as well as identifying all the actors 
involved and what role the play in this crisis which will help to get to an objective answer of 
the question mentioned above. Looking at the arguments behind the demand for an 
international peacekeeping mission and analyzing the circumstances in which the conflict 
happens lead us to a main hypothesis to answer this question - that an external military 
presence can constitute an international peacekeeping mission in Donbas if in Russian 
perception it does not represent a threat to its security and it is accepted by all belligerents.  
 
2. Peace enforcement mission in Eastern Ukraine. 
Concerning the possibility of a peacekeeping mission it is relevant to define what we 
mean by peacekeeping, agreeing here with the author Fortuna (2008:5) that peacekeeping 
is an operation where international personnel is send to help preserving peace and security 
in the result of a war, these personnel is mainly military although they are not necessarily 
armed and they have among them civilian personnel as well. The dilemma here it is not just 
about a Donbas peacekeeping mission in general, as the OSCE has already sent one mission 
there which nowadays it represents more than 700 people monitoring and verifying the 
ceasefire agreement (Osce.org, 2016). The issue here is about the possibility of a peace 
enforcement mission in Eastern Ukraine as the agreements of Minsk are repeatedly violated 
by the parts and the military confrontation continues proving that the OSCE monitoring 
mission is not enough for preserving the peace there.  
The problem of a peace enforcement mission in Ukraine lays already in its definition 
as the author Fortuna (2008:5) mentions that this involves a significant military force to 
provide security and guarantee the obedience to the cease-fire agreement. They have a 
mandate to use their weapons for purposes of self-defense. This is the kind of operation that 
Ukrainian government is calling for, arguing that it is much needed, although there is not a 
consent from the parts of DPR or LPR (Interfax: Ukraine Business Daily, 2015). Even though 
the consent of the rebels is not a necessary condition for this kind of operation, the segment 
of significant military forces present in this kin od mission is a problem, taking into account 
that it is going to be deployed near the border with Russia and the later one usually 
interprets this kind of action as a threat to its security and has the veto right in the Security 
Council of the UN.  
Going back to Ukrainian crises in Donbas and analyzing why there is a need of an 
international military presence to help keeping the peace in the region we need to have a 
look at the belligerent’s demand for peacekeeping. According to Fortuna (2008 :23) the 
probability of a peacekeeping mission in a case of government victory in the conflict is very 
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unlikely as it can restore alone the political control and would not allow the peacekeepers to 
interfere in its own dealings with the rebels (ibdem:22). From the beginning of the conflict 
that was the case as ATO (Anti-Terrorist Operation) until August 2014 had great success 
capturing several cities, including strategic ones such as Sloviansk considered by Ukrainian 
president as a “start of turning point” in the conflict (BBC News, 2016). But in August the 
events changed dramatically when Ukrainian army suffered a tragic defeat in the region of 
Ilovaisk (Kim, 2014) in Donbas from pro-Russian rebels and Russian army as the Ukrainian 
president states (Poroshenko, 2014).  
    The stronger the rebels are, bigger is the probability of a peacekeeping mission as 
the government wants peacekeepers and the rebels do not, because the losing part is trying 
to prevent the military success to be translated into political gains (Fortuna 2008:22). If the 
government wants a peacekeeping mission it has to convince the international community to 
intervene on its behalf, one of the reasons would be that it may help to protect them, 
although in Ukrainian case, the international community reacted very cautiously and 
unwillingly (Interfax: Ukraine Business Weekly, 2015), but if this kind of intervention will 
happen it is very probable to be one of enforcement mission and not a consent-based 
mission (Fortuna 2008:23). 
 
3.International military peacekeeping demand. 
   The demand for an international military peacekeeping mission from Ukrainian 
government reveals a complex problem of defining the parts of the conflict which we could 
say brings new dilemmas towards sending a military contingent as a peacekeeping mission. 
Most of the conflicts in which the UN military peacekeeping mission are involved have a 
predominant character of civil war and none of them include the fact where a part of the 
conflict has a direct support from a great military power.  
  In the Ukrainian crisis since the beginning it was very difficult to identify who was 
de facto the other belligerent part that Ukrainian forces were fighting with. The war in 
Ukraine has turned into some kind of new confrontation known as the “hybrid war” or 
“hybrid warfare” where in this case Russia is accused of using Chechens, Kazakhs, 
Dniestrians, and other entities in the Eastern region of Ukraine to support the separatists 
(Basescu, 2014). Russia has many times denied these facts and any interference in 
Ukrainian conflict of Donbas but this does not change the fact that, as one author has 
stated, if OSCE had put military personnel on its mission they could have got into direct 
military confrontation with Russian commandos (Gowan, 2015). This kind of high risk 
possible situations in a military intervention could jeopardize even more the peace and 
security in the region as many western leaders argued that Ukrainian crisis could lead to a 
direct military confrontation with Russia (Maskaliunaite, 2014). 
The demand from Ukrainian government of a military presence as a peacekeeping 
mission has gone further than just declarations, taking another step and providing a legal 
framework for such operations as the Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko has signed a 
new law which provides the access of foreign troops for an international peacekeeping and 
security operation on Ukrainian territory in order to maintain peace and security on its 
territory under a UN or the EU resolution, but the law bans the participation in operations of 
armed forces by the states "which have launched an armed aggression against Ukraine" 
(Interfax: Ukraine Business Weekly, 2015). In other words, it bans Russia to any 
participations in this kind of operations, actually Russia was accused of using a peacekeeping 
cover to military invade Ukraine (Interfax: Ukraine Business Daily, 2014). At this point some 
regional organizations or ad hoc coalitions that can undertake a military peacekeeping 
mission (Fortuna 2008 :8) and have Russian military personnel are “out of the game” such 
as Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or even the OSCE.  
 As an alternative to a UN enforcement peacekeeping mission Ukrainian government 
has asked for another regional organization that has experience in peacekeeping missions 
and could fit into its legal framework of a military external presence for a mission of 
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peacekeeping enforcement: the EU, which could send its peacekeepers to Ukraine without a 
UN mandate 3 although this mandate could provide more political opportunities. The 
presence of UN blue helmets is theoretically possible because if sanctioned by the Security 
Council it can be ensured through the General Assembly which requires the approval by two 
thirds of the votes, a task not impossible to achieve according to Yuriy Serheyev 4. The 
issues here are more practical, considering the high cost of such a combined mission in a 
format which the UN and the European Union may be present (Interfax: Ukraine Business 
Weekly, 2015). 
 
4. The EU’s peacekeeping mission. 
For its part the EU refuses so far to send a military peacekeeping mission in Donbas 
arguing that the mission should be purely civilian5 as the Union already has one operation 
which is advising the Ukrainians on judicial and security changes while the OSCE has a group 
that include Russians and Ukrainians as members and are already doing the monitoring of 
the Minsk cease-fire agreement. (Norman, L., Shchetko, N., 2015) 
Sending a civilian EU’s Advisory Mission to mentor and advice Ukrainian officials on 
civilian security sector reform and to soft balance Russia (Nováky, 2015:244) does not seem 
enough as after almost two years of conflict, OSCE reports of sporadic military 
confrontations continue to come. The EU’s lack of hard balancing bounds Brussels to deal 
with Ukrainian crisis just in a diplomatic way or putting economic pressure on Russia rather 
than sending some military personnel that could come under pro-Russian rebel fire in the 
buffer zone (Normal, 2015). The other regional hegemon (Russia) also has an interest in 
keeping the regional order and maintaining its status quo (Bellamy 2004:35). This fact is 
another fear of Ukrainian part that a new frozen conflict is going to emerge in Donbas the 
same as the ones in Moldova and Georgia and it would constitute a factor of political 
destabilization and undermine any progress or reforms inside of Ukraine. At the same time 
Moscow shows more cooperation and works more towards a political solution in the conflict 
region looking for to lift some West sanctions at the EU meeting in June 2016 when it is 
decided on extending of the sanctions or not (BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union., 2016).  
   Russian power controlling the rebel part is reflected in the dynamic of the conflict 
because striking a deal for peace requires dealing more with Russia than straight with the 
rebel groups, after many of them not directly controlled by Moscow were annihilated in 
recent months. If this is the situation, a solution6 that would suit this hegemon power, 
should reduce drastically the violence in Eastern Ukraine and reduce to minimum the 
necessity of a peace enforcement mission there, but the UN cannot choose to engage very 
closely with Russian peacekeeping initiatives, otherwise it appears to legitimize Moscow 
regional ambitions (Morris, McCoubrey, 1999:86) in Ukraine, therefore, the military mission 
should be strictly international. On the other hand, we cannot underestimate the Ukrainian 
civil society that will not accept a divided country in “republics of DPR or LPR” or support a 
regime in Kiev that would agree with Russia’s proposal which means that the violence could 
continue. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The events in Donbas has shown one more time how complex the conflicts are and 
how problematic is the task to find a solution for them especially if the solutions incorporate 
military force segments. The Ukrainian crisis continues to expose many impasses of 
enforcement peacekeeping missions and particularly to this crisis, is finding a mission that 
would have the consensus of all the parts of the conflict, which so far seemed impossible to 
                                                 
3 Russia veto could be used. 
4 Ukraine's permanent representative at the UN. 
5 Some kind of border advisory mission. 
6 Organize a joint government in Donbass. 
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achieve. The blue helmets in the buffer zone are much needed, an argument that most of 
belligerents agree with, but on the other hand the provenience of this troops is so important 
to the parts that they are ready to continue the fighting if the peacekeepers are not that 
ones they enquire. 
Many international organizations that have experience in peacekeeping could provide 
their troops for this task but considering the circumstances above analyzed in this essay the 
most legitimate and capable is just the UN. Its military presence in Donbas with all the risk 
to come under pro-Russian rebel’s fire could guarantee the peace in the buffer zone. This 
kind of military mission as far as it will not have in its component NATO or EU´s troops 
cannot represent a real threat to Russian security. The countries which would provide this 
troops we believe is the key to the success to such a mission, the ones that are not direct 
interested in the outcome of this conflict and have good relationships with Russia and 
Ukraine.  The dilemma of this proposed military peacekeeping operation is convincing these 
countries that this military mission is for their benefits too. The outcome of this intervention 
puts at risk their partnership and cooperation with Russia for the sake of integrity and peace 
of Ukraine a region somewhere on the map of Eastern Europe.  
For this kind of operation to happen peacekeeping should be seen in the eyes of 
world leaders as a sacred mission that is beyond all national interest and also that peace and 
stability in international community is a duty above all duties for all the States. Utopic as it 
seems we have an optimistic view on solving Ukrainian crisis knowing that in the history of 
humanity the twenty first century is the time where instruments for keeping peace are 
adapting and transforming each day, searching for new ways of keeping the International 
Community safe and sound. 
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